The belief that law enforcement officers must read the Miranda warnings before administering field sobriety tests is a common misconception in the United States. This myth originates from the misunderstanding of the purpose and application of the Miranda rights, established by the landmark case Miranda v. Arizona in 1966. The Miranda warning, typically beginning with “You have the right to remain silent,” is a critical part of the criminal justice process, serving as a procedural safeguard to protect an individual’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. However, the scope of its application is often misinterpreted.
In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that incriminating statements made by a defendant in police custody would be admissible at trial only if the police had previously informed the defendant of their rights. These rights include the right to remain silent, the right to an attorney, the warning that anything the suspect says can and will be used against them in court, and the assurance that if the suspect cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for them.
However, the Miranda warnings are only required when two specific conditions are met: custody and interrogation. The first condition, custody, means that the individual is under arrest or in a situation where they are not free to leave. The second condition, interrogation, refers to actions or words by law enforcement officials that they should know are likely to elicit an incriminating response. It’s when both of these conditions are met that Miranda rights must be read.
In the context of field sobriety tests (FSTs), which typically include the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, the walk-and-turn test, and the one-leg stand test, these are conducted during a traffic stop, a situation that is typically considered a temporary detention rather than custody. While the individual may not feel free to leave, the U.S. Supreme Court has held in Berkemer v. McCarty that ordinary traffic stops are not custodial for the purposes of Miranda.
Furthermore, FSTs do not fall under the definition of an interrogation. The U.S. Supreme Court defined interrogation in Rhode Island v. Innis as any actions or words by law enforcement officers that they should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. In the context of FSTs, law enforcement officers are observing physical signs of impairment, such as balance, coordination, and the ability to follow instructions. These are not incriminating statements but rather physical evidence. The police are not asking questions designed to elicit incriminating responses; instead, they are making observations. Therefore, the Miranda warnings are not required before administering these tests.
This is not to say that statements made during the administration of FSTs cannot be incriminating or that they cannot be used in court. For example, spontaneous statements made by a suspect during a FST, such as “I can’t do this even when I’m sober,” could be used as evidence of impairment. But the absence of a Miranda warning does not make such statements inadmissible because they were not the product of a custodial interrogation.
In conclusion, while the Miranda warnings are a vital component of the U.S. criminal justice system, they are not universally required in every interaction with law enforcement. Specifically, they are not required before the administration of field sobriety tests during a traffic stop. This common misconception likely arises from a misunderstanding of the specific legal triggers for the Miranda warning: custody and interrogation. Understanding the nuances of these legal principles can help clarify when and where Miranda rights apply.
